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The Mathematicians think there are insensible lines, about these they harangue, these cut
in a point, at all angles these are divisible ad infinitum. We Irish men can conceive no
such lines. George Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries (1708 - 1709)
Abstract
Berkeley, arguing against Barrow, claims that the infinite divisibility of finite lines
is neither an axiom nor a theorem in Euclid The Thirteen Books of The Elements.
Instead, he suggests that it is rooted in ancient prejudice. In this paper, I attempt to
substantiate Berkeley’s claims by looking carefully at the history and practice of ancient
geometry as a first step towards understanding Berkeley’s mathematical atomism.
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Introduction

Writing in the fourth century BCE, Aristotle wrote in Physics 200b15-200b21,“What is
infinitely divisible is continuous;” and in Physics 207b16-207b21 the converse, “What is
continuous is divi[sible] ad infinitum.”1 The Aristotelian view that magnitudes are infinitely
divisible was endorsed by Isaac Barrow in the mid seventeenth century. Barrow was the
first Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, a post later held by his student
Isaac Newton.2 In Lecture IX of his Mathematical Lectures he said:
There is no part in any kind of magnitude, which is absolutely the least.
Whatever is divided into parts, is divided into parts which are again divisible...whatsoever is continued is always divisible into parts again divisible. I
am not ignorant, how diﬃcult this doctrine is admitted by some, and entirely
rejected by others.
Berkeley, who had certainly read Barrow, in the early eighteenth century CE was one of
the dissidents. He wrote:
1
2

All references to Aristotle in what follows are taken from the translations contained in Aristotle (1984).
For Barrow’s view I have used Barrow (1734) Mathematical Lectures published posthumously in 1683.
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The infinite divisibility of finite extension, though it is not expressly laid down3 ,
either as an axiom or theorem in the the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed, and thought to have so inseparable and
essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in geometry, that
mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. A
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (PHK, henceforth)
§123 (W2: 99)4
In this paper, I want to unpack this debate between Barrow and Berkeley. There are a lot
of philosophical issues that come up in this debate. So in order to keep my paper within a
reasonable length, I will only focus on evaluating Berkeley’s claim in his actual published
work i.e. the claim from PHK §123 that infinite divisibility is not an axiom or theorem of
Euclidean geometry.5 In other work (Mwakima, 2020), I discuss Berkeley’s mathematical
atomist thesis in more detail, the view that magnitudes are composed of indivisible points
or minima tangibilia together with distance and ordering relations.6
My strategy for evaluating Berkeley’s claim is based on a clue given by Berkeley in The
Philosophical Commentaries (PC, henceforth) 263 W1:33:
To Enquire most diligently Concerning the Incommensurability of Diagonal &
side. whether it Does not go on the supposition of unit being divisible ad
infinitum, i.e of the extended thing spoken of being divisible ad infinitum (unit
being nothing also V. Barrow Lect. Geom:). & so the infinite indivisibility
deduc’d therefrom is a petitio principii. PC 263 W1:33
This clue suggests going back to Heath (1956)’s Euclid The Thirteen Books of The Elements
(The Elements, henceforth) in order to look for any evidence that refutes or substantiates
Berkeley’s claim in PHK §123. I will argue that Berkeley is right in pointing out that
infinite divisibility is neither an axiom nor a theorem in The Elements.7 The view that
3

In fact, Barrow (1734, pp. 153, 155) claimed that even though mathematicians rarely openly assume
infinite divisibility, they covertly assume it. So it is a bit surprising that he went to such a great extent to
defend it. This is what I discuss in what follows.
4
I shall follow contemporary Berkeleyan scholarship abbreviations where, for example, ‘W2:99’ refers to
volume 2 page 99 of Luce and Jessop (1957) The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne.
5
See Jesseph (1993, Chap. 2) and Jesseph (2005) for how Berkeley’s thought evolved from the Philosophical Commentaries to the PHK.
6
This view, I argue has roots in Pythagoras, Epicurus and Gassendi. Gassendi is mentioned by Berkeley
in The New Theory of Vision(NTV, henceforth) §75 (W1:200) and Epicureanism is mentioned by Berkeley
in PHK §93 (W2:82) contra Jesseph’s claim in Jesseph (1993, 67).
7
For an opposing view see Jesseph (1993, 48 - 53) and Jesseph (2005, 278 - 284). My paper is not
intended as a critical evaluation Jesseph’s view, although along the way I identify the ways in which I

2

David Mwakima

Berkeley on Infinite Divisibility

magnitudes are infinitely divisible is a philosophical thesis due to Aristotle – it is neither
an axiom in The Elements nor does it follow from The Elements Book I Proposition 10
(To bisect a given finite line). The upshot of my paper will be to show that Berkeley is
right where he says:
Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions, which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only
themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged
from all examination. PHK §124
Anticipating what follows, my argument is that the long-held view of identifying infinite
divisibility with continuity is a view due to Aristotle’s idiosyncratic conception of mathematics. The idiosyncrasy will become clear when I compare the Pythagorean conception
of mathematics with the Aristotelian conception of mathematics in section 3 below. In the
claim in PHK §123, Berkeley was seeking a conception of geometry that was more faithful
to The Elements than was Aristotle’s conception. The faithfulness consisted in abandoning
Aristotle’s philosophical thesis of infinite divisibility and potentially existing points, and
adopting the alternative view of construing geometrical magnitudes as composed of actual
points or what Berkeley called geometrical minima.8
Together with the textual evidence from The Elements and evidence from commentators on The Elements like Proclus (1970) and Heath (1956), the soundness of my argument
depends on whether I am justified in claiming that Aristotle’s appeal to infinite divisibility
is (1) based on an alternative conception of mathematics; and (2) a failure by Aristotle to
distinguish between mathematical atomism from physical atomism, the view that all there
is are atoms and void.9 I will not be concerned with (2) in this paper.10 The focus of my
diﬀer. There is a lot that I have learned from Jesseph and there is a lot in his view that I agree with. My
intention is to open up the possibility for fruitful debate regarding these matters by oﬀering the historical
and philosophical background that could have influenced Berkeley’s philosophy of mathematics.
8
In Mwakima (2020) I develop this idea. In that paper I argue that the geometrical minima of Berkeley
are actual points with the canonical two place distance function d and order. d satisfies, for example, that
d(x, y) = 0 ↔ x = y for any two points x, y. Existing discussions in the literature such as Jesseph (1993,
58) appear to me mistaken on their evaluation of Berkeley. There is, for instance, no careful discussion
by Jesseph of the distinction between parts and points; and between distance and cardinality. As a result
Jesseph confuses Berkeley’s correct claim that for any two points x, y in a finite line such that x < y, the
Euclidean distance d(x, y) = y − x or parts between these two points is some finite number of units of
distance, with the incorrect claim that a finite line has a finite number of points.
9
This claim has been made by Garber (1992, 123) and the sources cited there. Aristotle argues as if a
mathematical thesis – the convergence of geometric series – must be true of the real world in order to solve
Zeno’s paradoxes. See the discussion by Heath in Heath (1956, Vol. 1, 233f.).
10
See Mwakima (2020).
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paper will be to defend (1) in order for my argument to be sound. With respect to this
defense, I argue that it is Aristotle’s conception of mathematics that led subsequent mathematicians, including Barrow, to misunderstand the upshot of the Pythagorean number
theoretic discovery of the geometrical thesis that asserts the existence of incommensurable
magnitudes – literally magnitudes that cannot be measured by a common measure – as
alluded to by Berkeley in the clue from PC.11
The results of my paper would be of interest, I hope, not only to historians of philosophy,
but also mathematicians interested in the history and philosophy of the continuum in general12 ; physicists interested in questions regarding the nature of the space-time manifold13 ;
and philosophers interested in the history of Zeno’s paradoxes and its modern formulation
using the tools of measure theory.14 Someone may say that the question of continuity of
spatial figures or bodies is an empirical question and whether or not infinite divisibility of
magnitudes is true cannot as far as we know be settled a priori or empirically.15 We know
that Cantor and Dedekind postulated the principle of continuity for spatial magnitudes.16
Thus, it seems to be pointless to argue for or against infinite divisibility a priori. Nevertheless, while we might question whether there really is a right or wrong answer on the basis
of reason alone (this I take to be the upshot of Kant’s Second Antinomy17 ); this by itself
does not mean that the question is philosophically uninteresting. What I hope to show in
what follows is how intricate this question was and what mathematical and philosophical
assumptions went into it – assumptions which Berkeley was evaluating a priori.
Here’s how I have organized my paper. In the next section I introduce the terms which
set the debate regarding infinite divisibility: how to conceive of points and how to understand the part-to-whole relation in The Elements. In section 3, I show how Aristotle’s
idiosyncratic conception of mathematics led him to reconceptualize continuity – a process
which, among other things, culminated in the characterization of continuous quantities
in terms of infinite divisibility. I also show how and why someone who ascribes to the
11

See section 3 below for a more careful discussion.
An up-to-date discussion can be found in Reeder (2018) together with the sources cited there and
Kanamori (2020).
13
What I have in mind is: (1) the issue between gunkologists (region-based conception of spacetime
manifold) and pointillists (point-based conception of the spacetime manifold) views on the nature of the
continuum. See Fano, Orilia, and Macchia (2014) for discussion; and (2) the assumption that space is
continuous in continuum mechanics.
14
What I have in mind is the work of among others Skyrms (1983), Sherry (1988) and Ehrlich (2014).
15
See Maddy (1997, 143-157) for discussion regarding the validity of the assumption that space is continuous.
16
See Heath (1956, Vol. 1, 234 - 237).
17
See Friedman (1995) for Kant and infinite divisibility.
12
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Pythagorean conception of mathematics together with the theory of proportions by Eudoxus can work without the notion of (potential) infinite divisibility in order to substantiate
Berkeley’s claim in PHK §123.

2
2.1

Points and Parts
Does infinitely many parts of a whole W imply that W is infinite?

Following his remark that the thesis of infinite divisibility is neither assumed nor proved in
The Elements, Berkeley gives a surprising argument that what is infinitely divisible must
contain infinitely many parts and consequently be infinitely large. I propose that we start
here and work backwards to substantiate Berkeley’s initial remark in PHK §123.
If the terms extension, parts, and the like, are taken in any sense conceivable,
[...] then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number,
is so manifest a contradiction. PHK §124 (W2: 99)
[W]hen we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely
great. PHK §128 (W2: 101)
There are really two arguments here although in the second quotation it is only implicitly
implied by the talk of meaning. In the first argument Berkeley is arguing that from the
supposition that a finite line (he uses ‘extension’) consists of infinitely many lines, it follows
that the original line is infinite. But the original line is finite. Hence it follows by reductio
that our supposition was wrong. The second implicit argument in the claim in the second
quotation is that if a line is infinitely divisible, then we must we mean a line which is
infinitely long. Since it is common ground that there are no infinitely long lines, it follows
by reductio again, that our supposition was wrong.18
There are several proposals open to someone who wishes to reject Berkeley’s argument.
One may challenge the assumption that it was common ground in the seventeenth century
18
I thank Jeremy Heis for fruitful discussion of these issues. Initially I had thought that Berkeley wanted
to give a complicated or novel instrumentalist interpretation of infinite divisibility based on his doctrine
of signs. I have come to see that was not his intention at all. In PHK §§125 - 128 he is oﬀering one
possible explanation, on the basis of his representative theory of generality, for what might have led the
mathematicians, erroneously, to suppose the thesis of infinite divisibility. It does not mean that this
explanation is the right one nor does it mean that this is the only way to construe the thesis of infinite
divisibility or lead to its acceptance within mathematics. Cf. Jesseph (1993, 72 - 74) who thinks Berkeley
is oﬀering an instrumentalist account. I address this instrumentalist reading of Berkeley’s philosophy of
mathematics in Mwakima (2020).
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that there are no infinite lines. In recent work19 , Schechtman has argued that Locke
accepts the notion of an infinite “measure.”20 It is not clear on Schechtman’s proposal
whether the contrast between ‘number’ and ‘measure’ is supposed to be identical to the
contrast between ‘number’ and ‘magnitude’ in Aristotle’s account of quantity.21 According
to Schechtman, the notion of measure operative in Locke’s account is the following: k is a
measure of some quantity Q if and only if k is a mode (i.e. a “way of being”) of Q and:
1. k = n for some natural number n, or
2. For every quantity P whose measure is some natural n, k > n
What this means is that a measure is either a natural number (in the finite case), or
a mode of quantity that is greater than any given natural number. On the basis of this,
she proposes that Locke’s notion of quantitative infinity is expressed by the formula below
(where F x stands for ‘x is finite’ and k and l are measures):
∃k∀l(F l → k > l)
Schechtman’s proposal is that this formula states the existence of a measure that is greater
than any finite number, though it is not itself a number.
It is hard to see how one can compare two heterogeneous things (l a number and k
which is not a number) with respect to size as Schechtman proposes.22 Let us waive this
diﬃculty for now and ask: if it is not a number, then what is it? Schechtman tells us that it
is a mode of quantity. On Schechtman’s view, this mode of quantity is absolute space since
space is a mode of quantity.23 So we can take k as the mode of quantity identical to our
idea of (absolute) space in the formula above – an idea which is empirically derived from an
actually infinite absolute space. There’s prima facie evidence for Schechtman’s proposal
in what Locke says in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay, henceforth)
II.xvii.4:
19

Schechtman (2019, fn. 17, p. 1123; fn. 26, p. 1127; and pp. 1140 - 1141)
This is not the precise mathematical notion studied in measure theory. She uses this argument in order
to disentangle Locke’s quantitative notion of infinity from Leibniz’s iterative notion of infinity and from
Descartes’ ontic notion of infinity. One of her most interesting claims is that while Locke accepts the notion
of an infinite measure, Leibniz rejects both the notion of an infinite number and the notion of an infinite
measure, although Leibniz accepts the iterative infinite.
21
See §3.1 below.
22
See Mancosu (1996, 35) where one of the properties of magnitudes in classical geometry is that only
homogeneous magnitudes can be ordered by a total relation <.
23
See Schechtman (2019, 1129 - 1130) for Schechtman’s argument and Locke’s Essay II.xvii.1 for the
claim that the idea of space is a mode of quantity.
20
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It is a quite diﬀerent consideration, to examine whether the mind has the idea
of such a boundless space actually existing, since our ideas are not always proofs
of the existence of things: But yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose
I may say, that we are apt to think that space in itself is actually boundless; to
which imagination, the idea of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us.
Although Locke here appears to say that space is actually “boundless,” I don’t think
that this is a counterexample to the view that it is common ground in the early modern
period that there are no infinite lines or magnitudes. One reason is that in Schechtman’s
paper, there is no careful distinction between magnitudes and numbers. The discussion
is weighted more heavily on the side of explicating quantities in terms of numbers or
measures than in characterizing what magnitudes are and whether magnitudes can be
infinite.24 Furthermore, there is no discussion of what has come to be known as the
Eudoxus-Archimedes Axiom (The Elements Book V. Definition 4) in Schechtman’s paper;
yet this axiom makes the connection between numbers, measures and magnitudes explicit
and rules out the existence of infinite magnitudes.
Eudoxus-Archimedes Axiom
Magnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another which are capable, when multiplied, of
exceeding one another.25
While Schechtman is right that numbers measure magnitudes, they do so in terms of the
theory of proportions (Books V, VII and X in The Elements) and in accordance with
this axiom.26 Locke would have known that this axiom rules out the existence of infinite
magnitudes regardless of his remarks regarding the infinity space.27 Moreover, this axiom
helps make sense of what Locke is saying in the chapter On Infinity (Essay II.xvii.7):28
24

Schechtman (2019, 1120 - 1123)
Cf. Mancosu (1996, 36) who puts it this way: Given any two magnitudes A and B such that A < B,
there is a natural number n such that nA > B. This axioms rules out infinite magnitudes because if B is
infinite and A < B, there is no natural number n such that nA > B. It also rules out infinitesmals, but this
requires a more careful discussion. See Mwakima (2020) for a development of Berkeley’s argument against
infinitesmals.
26
See §3.1 below for more discussion.
27
See Mancosu (1996, 36) who speaks of the seventeenth century slogan, “There is no proportion between
the finite and the infinite.”
28
Cf. Schechtman (2019, fn. 26, p. 1127). It is interesting that Berkeley makes use of the same distinction
which he attributes to Locke in his short monograph On Infinities (W4: 234 - 239) read before the Dublin
Philosophical Society on 19 November 1707. “Now I am of opinion that all disputes about infinites would
cease, & the consideration of quantitys infinitely small no longer perplex Mathematicians, would they but
joyn Metaphysics to their Mathematics, and condescend to learn from Mr. Locke what distinction there is
betwixt infinity and infinite.” W4:239
25
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Therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say that we are carefully
to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space
infinite: The first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind,
over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have actually in the mind the
idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually
to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space, which an endless repetition
can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.
Here Locke is cautioning us against identifying the truth regarding the infinity of space
(what he called the boundlessness of space) with the assertion that space is infinite. One
way of understanding his point here is that asserting that space is infinite (in magnitude)
would contradict the Eudoxus-Archimedes axiom because to represent an infinite magnitude, we’d need to take an infinite number of repetitions of the common measure. Since an
actual infinite number of repetitions would violate the Archimedian axiom, it follows that
we can’t represent an infinite magnitude or space. Thus, Schechtman’s proposal does not
challenge the assumption that it is common ground that there are no infinite magnitudes
or lines.
The other way taken by scholars of responding to Berkeley’s argument is to point
out that Berkeley is missing the obvious property of convergent geometric series.29 A
convergent geometric sequence is an infinite sequence sn with n ∈ N of terms with a common
ratio | sn+1
sn | = |r| < 1 between successive terms (sn and sn+1 ). An infinite geometric series
is an infinite series such that the sequence of partial sums Sn converges. For example,
the sum of the terms in the geometric sequence ⟨1, 12 , 14 , . . . , 21n , . . . ⟩ for n ∈ N is 2. This
sequence converges since the common ratio |r| = 12 < 1.
But I don’t think that Berkeley is ignorant of the existence of convergent geometric
series or denying the theorems which support them. First of all, The Elements does not
discuss the notions of convergence and divergence of infinite series. So pointing out the
existence of convergent sequences, supports rather than refutes Berkeley’s argument that
infinite divisibility is not in The Elements. The mathematics of infinite series was made
precise in the 19th century with the work of Cauchy and Weierstrass aimed at rigorously
reformulating analysis.30
29

This is a point that Fogelin (1988, 52 - 53) and Franklin (1994) make.
The terms ‘convergent’ and ‘divergent’ were used by James Gregory in 1668 but he did not develop
the ideas. Newton only aﬃrmed that power series converge for small values of the variable and for the
geometric series. Leibniz showed that series whose terms alternate in sign and decrease in absolute value
monotonically to zero converge. See Kline (1972, Vol. 2, 461) and for Cauchy and Weierstrass see Kline
(1972, Vol. 3, 948, 952, 963ﬀ.).
30
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Moreover, according to commentators, it is Aristotle, not The Elements, who was one
of the first to use “convergence of a geometric sequence” synonymously with “potentially
infinitely divisible” as a response to Zeno’s paradoxes.31 Zeno in supposing that magnitudes
are infinitely divisible, intended this to imply that the magnitudes are actually divided
into infinitely many parts. He did not intend it in the restricted Aristotelian sense of
merely potentially infinitely divisible. His paradoxes were that a supertask would have to
be completed. A supertask is a task involving actually infinitely many steps completed
in finite time.32 For example, in the Dichotomy Paradox, the motion can never begin
because to start from the beginning of an interval to the half-way point of the interval, one
would have to traverse an actually infinite number of monotonically decreasing intervals
of space approaching the beginning of the interval. So if someone merely pointed out to
him that a geometric series converges as Aristotle did – speaking in terms of potential
infinite divisibility – Zeno would have been unconvinced that this solves the Dichotomy
Paradox. In other words, Aristotle’s shows why motion is possible (namely that the sum
of a convergent series is finite) not how it is possible (how can actually infinite many steps
be completed in a finite time). Here we see one way how Aristotle’s philosophical thesis of
potential infinite divisibility became associated with a mathematical theorem that asserts
the existence of convergent geometric sequences. The other way has to do with Aristotle’s
reconceptualization of continuity which I discuss below.
The Port Royal Logicians (Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole), Isaac Barrow and
John Keill33 continued this Aristotelian thought in the late seventeenth century and early
eighteenth century, arguing that the convergence of geometric series counts as a reason in
favor of infinite divisibility. Berkeley clearly read these mathematicians’ work as evidenced
by his notebook entries.34 It is within this intellectual milieu that Berkeley enters in order
to restore order. The intellectual (albeit virtual) exchange between Barrow and Keill on the
one side supporting infinite divisibility in mathematics and Berkeley on the other denying
it has been discussed in detail in Jesseph (1993, 63 - 67). However, one argument that
Jesseph does not discuss is the argument based on the convergence of geometric series.
Barrow (1734, 157), in Lecture IX, puts it this way:
[I]t is plainly taught and demonstrated by Arithmeticians, that an infinite series
31

See Heath (1956, Vol. 1, 233 - 234) for discussion. For the reference in Aristotle see Physics 206b4206b12.
32
For the supertasks reading of Zeno’s paradoxes see Black (1967) and Manchak and Roberts (2016).
33
Keill became the Savilian Professor of Astronomy in Oxford in 1712. For Keill’s view I have used Keill
(1745) An Introduction to Natural Philosophy: or Philosophical Lectures Read in the University of Oxford
1700 A.D.
34
See PC 263 W1:33 for example.
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of fractions, decreasing in a certain proportion, is equal to a certain number;
e.g. that such a series of fractions decreasing in a subsesquialter proportion is
equal to two, in a subduple proportion to unity, in subtriple to one half; from
whence it is not inconsistent for something finite to contain in it an infinity of
parts.
Since Berkeley read these authors, it is not true that he was ignorant of the possibility that
convergent geometric series would be counterexamples to his view that any magnitude that
contains infinitely many parts must be infinite.

2.2

What are parts?

Why, then, would Berkeley have been convinced that his arguments were sound? In the
previous subsection I rejected the view that Berkeley was simply ignorant of convergent
geometric series (a series with infinitely many parts yet finite in size). So in order to see
the soundness of Berkeley’s argument, we need to look more carefully at the meaning of the
term ‘extension’, the distinction between parts and wholes, and what infinite divisibility
(or its denial by Berkeley) even means.
Many have supposed that Berkeley’s denial of infinite divisibility entails that for every
line L there is a finite number of divisions n that can be done on L such that for all m > n,
L is not divisible further. This reading is wrong because Berkeley doesn’t think there are
indivisible lines. His geometrical minima are points not lines.35 At the same time, his
denial of infinite divisibility doesn’t entail that there are a finite number of points in a line.
The notion of cardinality which we get later with Cantor – such that a line has actually
infinitely many points – is alien to him. Berkeley consistently uses the notion of parts not
points in his arguments against infinite divisibility. This means that Berkeley is assuming
an actual ordered dense point set conception of a line and is analyzing the divisibility of
lines in metrical terms not in terms of cardinality. This metrical approach is justified by
Postulate 1 (To draw a straight line from any point to any point) and Postulate 3 (To
draw a circle with any centre and distance). This in turn means that when Berkeley says
lines are finitely divisible, he means that for any two points x, y in a finite line such that
x < y, the Euclidean distance d(x, y) = y − x or parts36 between these two points is some
finite number of units of distance. His argument in PHK §124 is that the sum of this finite
number of units of distance in a finite line can only be finite. Suppose otherwise, then there
See especially the New Theory of Vision §§54 - 61; PHK §127 and De Motu §15 at least.
Parts here is in the plural sense. See below for more discussion of what parts in the plural sense means
in Euclid.
35

36
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is an infinite number of units of distance between a point a, b in a finite line. But this is
absurd unless the line is infinite. For example, take the points to be the boundaries of the
finite line contained within the interval [0, 5]. Today we know that there are infinitely many
points in this interval. But once one adopts the Euclidean distance, then there are 5 units
of distance. Thus, by denying infinite divisibility, Berkeley wants us to draw at least two
conclusions. First, the sum of the d(x, y) = y − x units of distance between all points x, y
in a finite line is finite. That is, it is infinite only if the line is infinite. Secondly, Berkeley
denial of infinite divisibility presupposes that lines can be composed of indivisible points
or geometrical minima since Aristotle’s thesis regarding infinite divisibility is equivalent to
the thesis that continuous quantities are fundamentally non-atomic.
Nothing that is continuous can be composed of indivisibles: e.g. a line cannot
be composed of points, the line being continuous and the point indivisible [. . . ]
[I]t is plain that everything continuous is divisible into divisibles that are always
divisible; for if it were divisible into indivisibles, we should have an indivisible in
contact with an indivisible, since the extremities of things that are continuous
with one another are one and are in contact. The same reasoning applies
equally to magnitude, to time, and to motion: either all of these are composed
of indivisibles and are divisible into indivisibles, or none [of these are]. If time
is continuous, magnitude is continuous also [. . . ] If time is infinite in respect of
divisibility, length is also infinite in respect of divisibility.
Aristotle, Physics Book VI 231a18 - 20; 231b16-232a17; 233a13-233a21
Aristotle’s thesis of infinite divisibility applied to magnitudes (or lines) is equivalent to the
thesis that lines cannot be composed of points. By denying infinite divisibility, Berkeley
is rejecting this Aristotelian view in favor of the view that the division of a line can’t go
on infinitely because eventually contra Aristotle we must arrive at mathematical atoms
or points. So, the real question is this: do The Elements’s starting assumptions allow us
to draw the conclusion that finite lines are infinitely divisible or must division eventually
terminate into points? This is the issue and the reason why the convergence of geometric
series is not a counterexample to Berkeley’s denial of infinite divisibility in Aristotle’s sense.
Today, with a point-set conception of the continuum, the convergence of an infinite sequence
is proved by showing that after a finite – not infinite – large number N , all subsequent
terms sm with m > N are so close to each other that they are virtually indistinguishable
i.e. the distance between them is almost negligible or there is “no part” between them. So
beyond N , the Euclidean distance d(sm , sm+1 ) = sm+1 − sm between any two terms adds
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nothing significant to the already total finite distance of the terms before N . This is why
a geometric series converges to a finite number. It is not a counterexample to Berkeley’s
sense of denying infinite divisibility. What we need to find out is whether the picture I am
painting is consistent with The Elements as Berkeley or Barrow would have read it and
whether Berkeley is right that infinite divisibility does not follow from anything in The
Elements. The answer depends on what The Elements meant by parts and points.
The talk of “no part” in the context of convergent geometric series ought to remind
us of the starting point (pun intended) of The Elements. Famously, The Elements begins
with the definition of a geometrical point (points, henceforth) as “that which has no parts.”
But what does having “no parts” mean? One possibility could to be use our observation
in the case of convergent infinite sequences and say that “having no parts” means “having
no internal distance”, or what the early modern philosophers, following Descartes37 and
the Port Royal Logicians38 , express in terms of “lacking extension.” The Elements is not
clear on this. Kline (1972, Vol. 3, 1008) notes that one criticism that Moritz Pasch (1843
- 1930) made of The Elements had to do with The Elements’s definitions of ‘point’ and
‘part.’ In the geometrical Book V of The Elements, we read, “A magnitude is a part of a
magnitude, the less of the greater, when it measures the greater.” Taking this geometrical
characterization together with what we find in the arithmetical books (Books VII, VIII, IX
of The Elements), we may say that a part of a magnitude or number is what we call today a
factor or integral divisor according to some unit of distance or measure. Parts (plural) are
what we call today a fraction, although ancient geometers did not make use of expressions
which we use today when we talk about fractions.39 The introduction of fractions as
denoting quantities or real numbers had to wait until 1500 or so.40 The other mention The
Elements makes of ‘parts’ is in the discussion of the Common Notions. Common Notions
were self-evident truths with such widespread acceptance that most people adopted them
without proof. Some of these common notions were:
1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.
5. The whole is greater than the part.
37

In Rules for the Direction of the Mind Rule XIV it is noteworthy that Descartes disentangles his
notion of ‘extension’ from ‘quantity.’ In Meditation V, quantity is only applied to continuous quantity
and Descartes speaks of extended quantity. It is a thorny issue to try to understand what extension is for
Descartes so I will not get into that here. See Garber (1992) especially Chapter 3 and 5.
38
See Arnauld, Antoine and Nicole, Pierre (1996, 231-232) where the words “zero extension” are used.
39
Cf. Heath (1956, Vol. 2, 115) for Heath’s discussion of parts of a magnitude and Heath (1981, Vol. 1,
42) for a discussion on fractions.
40
See Kline (1972, Vol. 1, 251).
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Despite this widespread belief in antiquity, today it is hard to accept the fifth common
notion. Today we have set theory which oﬀers us the resources to distinguish between the
membership relation ∈ that holds between an element (or individual) and the class of which
it is a member; and the subset relation ⊂ that holds between a subclass and the class of
which it is a part. Thus one may be tempted to think of the part-to-whole relation in The
Elements in terms of the subset relation and argue that the common notion The Elements
is presupposing is open to obvious counterexamples. We know, for example, that in the
case of infinite sets, the whole is not necessarily greater than the part. While this result
would have been paradoxical to Galileo, Leibniz and Berkeley, it would be anachronistic
to try to refute their view on the basis of modern developments in mathematics.41
We must seek to understand Berkeley and his contemporaries on their own terms and
resist thinking about the part-to-whole relation in terms of the subset relation. Specifically,
we must resist the temptation of thinking, as we do today, that points are the elements in
a line (i.e. that the geometric continuum is a set of actually infinite points) while lines are
subsets of other lines. The point-set conception of the geometric continuum is a modern
invention beginning most explicitly with Cantor and Dedekind.
What The Elements means by the part-to-whole relation involves homogeneity, the
property of two or more things being similar in some respect. We may say that A is a part
of a whole B iﬀ A is homogeneous with B but not equal to (i.e. strictly less than) B.42
In The Elements and most ancient geometers, the part-to-whole relation in geometry is a
relation between homogeneous quantities since it is only the category of quantity, according
to Aristotle, that admits of the relation equal-to, less-than or greater-than.43 For example,
the parts of a (whole) line will be other (homogeneous) lines. A part of a (whole) multitude,
such as a collection of coins, will be another smaller collection of coins. This is all The
Elements intended by this common notion.
This suggests the following interpretation of The Elements’s definition of a point. In
41
I revisit Galileo’s paradoxes (Aristotle’s wheel and the equinumerosity of the set of square numbers
with the natural numbers) and Leibniz’s paradox of infinite number and their relation to Berkeley’s view
on the infinite in Mwakima (2020) where I discuss the distinction between distance and cardinality. There,
I argue that Berkeley is construing spatial magnitudes in terms of their metrical and order properties not
in terms of the cardinality of points in them. There’s a strong parallel to Berkeley’s thinking in Bolzano.
Bolzano realized that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the real numbers in the interval [0, 5]
and the interval [0, 12] given by y = 12x
a function from [0, 5] to [0, 12] but was still reluctant to accept
5
that these two intervals have the same “size.” We can explain Bolzano and Berkeley’s puzzlement because
they were thinking about size in distance or metrical terms rather than in terms of cardinality.
42
See The Elements Book V and Book VII also.
43
“[The] most distinctive of a quantity would be its being called both equal and unequal.” Categories
6a26-6a36.
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saying that point has no parts, The Elements means that there is nothing strictly less than
a point which is homogeneous to it. One point to take away here is that The Elements’s
definition of a point does not by itself tell us anything about the divisibility (or lack thereof)
of points. The definition clearly does not mention divisibility. Secondly, The Elements’s
definition does not deny that a point has what Plato called onkos (roughly, size or volume;
more of this below). I will take this to mean that The Elements’s definition of a point does
not deny that a point has minimal size.44 So saying that there is nothing less than a point
which is homogeneous to it does not entail that a point is nothing (i.e. that it has no size)
as Hume famously thought in considering alternatives to his position. Hume considered
his position (there are minima with color and solidity) to be the middle ground between
infinite divisibility and mathematical points.45 What it does entail is that there is nothing
smaller than a point which is homogeneous to it. This will be important in understanding
Berkeley’s mathematical atomism and his doctrine of minima tangibilia.
So where did this pervasive characterization of points as being indivisible originate? I
claim that this identification of a point with the indivisible started with Aristotle’s idiosyncratic conception of mathematics. This conception was developed in order to refute the
physical atomists (there are indivisible physical atoms that compose matter). In doing so,
Aristotle conflated the physical atomist thesis with what I have called the mathematical
atomist thesis (magnitudes are composed of actual points with distance and order relations
between them). The sixth century CE Neoplatonist Simplicius, one of the few extant ancient commentators on Aristotle’s Physics, has this to say in his commentary on Aristotle’s
Physics Book VI (this is the book that deals with continuity):
Aristotle set up the logical division of the divisible into either indivisibles or
forever divisibles, so that he might comprise the continuous in that which is
divisible into forever divisibles. Simplicius (2014, 23f) Trans. lines 931, 5 - 10
in MSS.
More recently, Miller, Jr. (1982, 88) has written,
Aristotle reformulated the old diﬃculties in his own terms and defined concepts
in order to resolve them...He presents his own theory of the continuum as the
44

There are complications with my attempt to reconstruct what Euclid might have meant by ‘point.’
These complications arise in view of recent developments in measure theory where a point is, indeed,
assigned measure 0. I revisit such complications in Mwakima (2020). See Skyrms (1983) for an excellent
introduction to the basics of measure theory.
45
See A Treatise on Human Nature II.iv. The literature on Hume and infinite divisibility is vast. Good
places to start are Jacquette (1996), Pressman (1997) and Holden (2002).

14

David Mwakima

Berkeley on Infinite Divisibility

only way out of an ancient dilemma which seeks to show the absurdity of
continuous magnitudes.
I return to the dilemma in a moment. The important take away, for now, from Simplicius
and Miller, Jr. is that Aristotle was reconceptualizing the debate and that this involved
identifying the continuous with the infinitely divisible. The identification of the point with
the indivisible is clearly stated in Aristotle’s Metaphysics V.6 1016b18-1016b30. Here he
writes:
But everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind. That which
is indivisible in quantity and qua quantity is called a unit if it is not divisible
in any dimension and is without position, a point if it is not divisible in any
dimension and has position.
It is not clear who Aristotle’s sources were for this characterization of points and units.46
What we do get clearly from Aristotle is one way to conceive of mathematical points is
that they are indivisible. But if they are indivisible, does it follow that the points have no
onkos or are nothing? ‘onkos’ is a technical term used in diﬀerent contexts – some of these
contexts are theatrical. Ancient scholars47 vary in translating ‘onkos’ as volume, measure
or simply spatial extension and are divided on this question and what implications it has
for our conception of points with respect to divisibility.48 For our purposes, it is suﬃcient
to note that it is the translation of onkos as spatial extension that has survived up to the
early modern period when Descartes and the Port Royal Logicians began speaking of a
point as that which has no (spatial) extension.
Laying aside the diﬃculty of how to translate or understand onkos, this question raises
a dilemma. On the one hand, if someone says that the mathematical points have no size
or spatial extension, then they are “nothing” and cannot be parts of magnitudes. For the
parts of magnitude are other (homogeneous) magnitudes with size. On the other hand, if
one says that the mathematical points have size (i.e. they are proper parts of magnitudes),
then they are not indivisible after all. Zeno, as presented by Aristotle, exploited this
dilemma with relish using his paradoxes. On the one hand, he forced Aristotle to reject
46

Cf. Proclus (1970, 78) Trans. lines 95.21 - 96.14. “A point is a unit that has position.” The Pythagorean
definition does not mention divisibility.
47
See (Pfeiﬀer, 2018, 130 - 131) for example.
48
See Vlastos and Owen discussed in Furley (1967, 67). Furley notes that Vlastos writes of Zeno’s
assumption, “that anything which does have size is at least logically divisible and has at least logically
discriminable parts.” But he also mentions Owen who writes that Zeno assumes without argument that
the conjunction of size with theoretical indivisibility would be a contradiction.
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indivisible magnitudes in favor of infinite divisibility. On the other hand, the Epicureans
and ancient atomists exploited the assumption that a magnitude is infinitely divisible into
parts with size to argue that this would imply that the original magnitude is infinite in size.
So they accepted indivisibles.49 We’ve already met this Epicurean argument in connection
with Berkeley.
As mentioned, Aristotle got himself out of this dilemma by arguing that the mathematical points have no size. Faced with the conclusion that they cannot be parts of
magnitudes or are “nothing”, he argues that points exist potentially. That is, rather than
accept that points are non-entities (since they lack onkos), Aristotle opted to say that a
point is actualized whenever a magnitude is split, say into two smaller magnitudes. Here’s
how Miller, Jr. (1982, 98) puts it:
Aristotle refutes the nihilistic horn [the name Miller, Jr. gives for the first horn
of the dilemma we’ve been discussing], used by atomists, by showing that even
though division is possible and a point exists everywhere in the potential mode,
it does not follow that magnitude reduces to points. For the existence of every
actually existing point is conditional upon the existence of two segments with
magnitude into which the subsection is divided.
Thus the same point is the limit or extremity of the two magnitudes resulting from the
split. That is, the point existed potentially before the split but now exists actually as a
limit or extremity of the two separate lines after the split.
How does Aristotle know that there is no location on a magnitude (such as a line) where
there is a “gap” that would prevent the splitting of a magnitude at that location? He does
not know this. Aristotle has to either prove that a magnitude (say a line) is continuous
in either the dense or Cantor-Dedekind complete sense first; or assume that it is before he
can argue that points exist potentially. In fact, Aristotle neither assumed nor proved any
of these alternatives since for him a line was not composed of points. What Aristotle did is
to assume that you can always bisect a line segment into two equal segments. Continuity
for him consisted in the identity of the right limit of the left segment and the left limit of
the right segment.50 On the basis of this analysis of the existence of points and continuity,
Aristotle drew the conclusion that continuous magnitudes (such as lines) are infinitely
divisible on the basis of the claim that bisections can be done an indefinite number of
times.51 Some geometers (see the quotation from Proclus in the next section), following
49

See Diogenes Laertius (2018, 507 - 522) for Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus. I develop the connection
between Epicureanism and Berkeley’s mathematical atomism in Mwakima (2020).
50
I thank Brian Skyrms for help in clarifying this part of my paper.
51
See Physics 207b10.
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Aristotle, then understood the infinite divisibility of finite lines to be a consequence or
assumption of what is now The Elements Book I Proposition 10. How warranted were
geometers to draw this consequence or make this assumption? Let us look at this next.

2.3

Infinite Divisibility and The Elements Book I Proposition 10

Proposition 10 in The Elements Book I is the proposition ‘To bisect a given straight line.’
The proof is familiar to most people from elementary geometry using compass and straightedge. The important point is that if one analyzes the proof, The Elements does not draw the
conclusion that this process can be iterated infinitely many times. We know that Aristotle
predated Euclid’s textbook The Elements and that Aristotle and his students at The
Lyceum had a diﬀerent geometry textbook that according to historians (Heath, 1981, Vol.
1, 321) was authored by Theudius. There was also an arithmetical textbook Elements of
Arithmetic apparently authored by Archytas (430 - 365 BCE) who also predates Aristotle.52
We may never know how Theudius proved this theorem and what conclusion he drew
because that textbook is lost. Thus, it is impossible to know definitively whether Euclid
and Aristotle diﬀered in their conception of ancient geometrical practice. Recent scholars
Linnebo and Shapiro (2019, 164) speculate:
Because of the structure of the geometric magnitudes (to echo Lear (1982)),
we have procedures that can be iterated indefinitely, and we speak about what
those procedures could produce, or what they will eventually produce if carried
suﬃciently (but only finitely) far. In holding that these geometric procedures
can be iterated indefinitely, Aristotle again follows the mathematical practice
of the time, this time in opposition to his other major opponents, the atomists,
who postulate a limit to, say, bisection.
Notice from Linnebo and Shapiro that this procedure is only indefinitely but finitely carried
out. For Aristotle, the ‘infinite’ in ‘infinitely divisible’ is really just large finite N for N as
large as we wish. So it was a little misleading for Aristotle to claim that infinite divisibility
follows from the bisection theorem.
Reiterating this point, this is how Proclus (1970, 216 - 217, Trans. lines 278 - 279 in
MSS.) puts it in his commentary on Book I, Proposition 10 (my emphasis).
[If a line] is not composed of indivisible parts, it will be divisible to infinity.
This, they say, appears to be an agreed principle in geometry, that a magnitude
52

See Heath (1956, Vol. 2, p. 295).
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consists of parts infinitely divisible. To this we shall give the reply of Geminus,
that geometers do assume, in accordance with a common notion, that what is
continuous is divisible. The continuous, we say, is what consists of parts that are
in contact, and this can always be divided. But they do not assume that what
is continuous is also divisible to infinity...it is an axiom that every continuum
is divisible; hence a finite line, being continuous, is divisible. This is the notion
that the author of the Elements uses in bisecting the finite straight line, not
the assumption that it is divisible to infinity. That something is divisible and
that it is divisible to infinity are not the same.
Proclus is urging us to distinguish what we are in fact bisecting. After the n > 1
bisection stage, we are strictly speaking not bisecting the original line. So it is false to say
that bisections of the original line can be done infinitely many times. The theorem says
that for each line the bisection can be done only once since all that continuity guarantees
is that any line segment is divisible i.e. there are no indivisible lines. But he also points
out that using The Elements Book I Proposition 10 as a proof for infinite divisibility of
the original line is an extrapolation or fallacy. Aristotle was one of those people who
fallaciously made the extrapolation from the bisection or divisibility of each line (true) to
potential infinite divisibility or bisection of the same original line (false). While it is true
that one needs to assume continuity as a common notion to argue for the actual existence
of a point as the limit of the two resulting line segments from bisection at a potentially
existing midpoint; Aristotle, eager to refute the physical atomists, was caught in a fallacy
of confusing the claim that every line is bisectable once (true) with the claim that the
same line is bisectable at every stage n > 1 (false). This is another source of evidence that
Berkeley is right to point out that (potential) infinite divisibility is not a theorem or axiom
in The Elements.
However, there is the issue of incommensurable magnitudes. Many have taken this
to be evidence for infinite divisibility. In fact, in this same commentary on Proposition
10, Proclus (1970, 217) says that infinite divisibility follows from the existence of incommensurable magnitudes. Later philosophers such as the Port Royal Logicians53 took the
existence of incommensurable magnitudes to be the definitive demonstration that there
are no indivisible parts in magnitudes. Incommensurability poses a threat for anyone who
denies infinite divisibility (like Berkeley) only if such a person: (1) believes that there are
indivisible lines; and (2) believes that the number of indivisible lines that a line can be
divided into corresponds to its size. For if (1) and (2) are true, then suppose that the
53

Arnauld, Antoine and Nicole, Pierre (1996, 231)
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hypotenuse of a right triangle with side of unit length can only be divided into a finite
number of lines m and the side can only be divided into a finite number of lines n where
m > n and m and n are in their least terms (i.e. having a greatest common divisor of one).
Then the existence of the ratio m : n would contradict the well-known theorem that there
√
are no numbers m, n in their least terms such that the proportion m : n :: 2 : 1 holds.54
But earlier I showed that Berkeley denies (1) because Berkeley doesn’t believe there
are indivisible lines. So incommensurability doesn’t pose a threat for Berkeley if he denies
infinite divisibility. But does incommensurability really imply or presuppose that magnitudes are infinitely divisible? Recall that in the quotation that gave me the clue for how to
approach this paper, Berkeley thought, contra Barrow, that deducing infinite divisibility
from the existence of incommensurables is a petitio principii in the passage we began with.
Why did he think so? This issue needs to be investigated even though I have shown that
the arguments in favor of infinite divisibility from incommensurability doesn’t threaten
Berkeley’s denial of infinite divisibility. Let me now turn to assessing the issue of incommensurables and whether they presuppose or imply the infinite divisibility of continuous
quantities. Here, I will show that the historical association of infinite divisibility and incommensurability arises from diﬀerent conceptions of mathematics (the Aristotelian and
the Pythagorean) and a historical confusion regarding the upshot of the number theoretic
process that led to the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes by the Pythagoreans in
the first place. Berkeley’s suggestion is that incommensurability (which arises in number theory) needs to be kept distinct from infinite divisibility (which arises in geometry).
This is one instance where Berkeley, unlike Barrow, is insisting on the distinction between
geometry and arithmetic (or number theory).

3

Aristotelian and Pythagorean views of Mathematics

3.1

Aristotle on Quantity

Aristotle’s views on quantity in his collected works begin with the account of quantity in
the Categories and is developed through the Physics and the Metaphysics. Throughout
these accounts, Aristotle consistently distinguishes between discrete quantities arithmos
(number) and continuous quantities megethos (magnitude). The genus term ‘quantity’ is
the Greek word ‘poson.’ But there’s also the question of how to translate terms like to pelikos (how great), onkos or extension/volume and metron or measure as ways of discussing
54

I thank Jeremy Heis for a fruitful discussion about the issue of incommensurability and how it bears
on infinite divisibility. See §3.3 below for discussion of this proof.
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quantity. The taxonomy is complicated and opens up a lot of philosophical debate.55 What
is important for my purposes is that however this taxonomy ends up being sorted out, it is
only one of the many other possible conceptions of mathematics that were available during
Aristotle’s time. At the heart of Aristotle’s philosophical defense of infinite divisibility
and the potential existence of points, I will argue, is that he held a diﬀerent conception of
mathematics. In doing so, he betrays an unfamiliarity with the import of the Pythagorean
discoveries in mathematics; and the subsequent codification of these discoveries by Eudoxus
in the theory of proportions in Book V and some of Theaetetus’s discoveries that ended
up being codified in Book X of The Elements. To be sure, Eudoxus and Aristotle were
contemporaries and Theaetetus predated both of them. We may never know whether Aristotle was acquainted with Eudoxus’s discoveries on the theory of proportions or whether
Theaetetus’s contribution, which we find in The Elements Book X was included in the
Theudius geometry textbook that was used in The Lyceum. In what follows (§3.2), Aristotle’s remarks in the Metaphysics suggest an unfamiliarity with how to place Pythagorean
number theoretic discoveries on rigorous geometrical foundations.

3.2

Pythagorean Mathematics: A non-Aristotelian Conception of Mathematics

It is diﬃcult to assess what Pythagoras actually believed because there is no extant work
written by Pythagoras. Any attempt to reconstruct what subsequent Pythagoreans actually believed cannot therefore be substantiated by anything from Pythagoras himself.
To get a sense of the Pythagorean view of mathematics we have to rely on second hand
accounts from philosophers like Plato and Aristotle some of whom, unfortunately, had
an axe to grind; and commentators like Iambilichus, Proclus and Diogenes Laertius. In
Metaphysics 985b23-986a13, Aristotle, for example, writes:
Contemporaneously with these philosophers and before them, the Pythagoreans, as they are called, devoted themselves to mathematics; they were the first
to advance this study, and having been brought up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things.
The history of arithmetic begins in Greece with Pythagoras who is believed to have lived
during the sixth century BCE. Historians speculate that Pythagoras was led to his numbermonism (all there is are numbers and proportions between numbers) by his discovery in
music theory of the harmonical proportion. That is, the fifth and the octave of a note
55

See Pfeiﬀer (2018) for the most up to date philosophical discussion of this taxonomy.
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could be produced on the same string by stopping at 23 and
Gow (1968, 68) writes about how led by such considerations,

1
2

of its length, respectively.

Pythagoras considered number to be the basis of creation: he looked to arithmetic for his definitions of all abstract terms and his explanation of all natural
laws.
Thus, beginning with number-monism, Pythagoreans went on to develop number theory
by classifying numbers as: odd, even, square, cube, triangular, perfect, defective, amicable
etc. Proportions were either arithmetical, geometrical and harmonical.56
Given this Pythagorean number-monism, the first distinction we can make between the
Aristotelian conception of mathematics and the Pythagorean is that on the one hand, for
the Pythagoreans there are no species of quantity. Aristotle is aware of this, writing in
Metaphysics 1080b17-1080b21:
Now the Pythagoreans, also, believe in one kind of number – the mathematical;
only they say it is not separate but sensible substances are formed out of it.
On the other hand, for Aristotle, magnitude and numbers are both species of the genus
quantity. The diﬀerentia, therefore, had to be sought. This diﬀerence was, for Aristotle, in
terms of continuity and discreteness. Aristotle goes to great extent to defend his view of
quantity first in the Categories and more fully in the Physics. In the Physics, he introduces
subtle distinctions between whole and part; and between things being successive (next to
each other), contiguous (touching), and finally continuous (synechi syn = together; echo =
to have/hold) which in the Latin was translated contenere (con = together; tenere = hold).
So the continuous is that which is “held-together.” The depth and rigor of Aristotle’s
penetrating analysis going from weaker to stronger conditions for what is required for
continuity is in an extended discussion in Physics beginning in Book III all the way to Book
VIII. Along the way, the association of infinity with continuity is made – an association
that is with us to this very day. Further, Zeno’s paradoxes of motion are considered and
supposedly rebutted using the machinery developed until that point.57
One key diﬀerence between Aristotle and the Pythagoreans in this regard, is that for
the Pythagoreans only numbers (i.e. positive integers greater than 1) can be answers to the
question of quantity (poson). These are questions that take the form “How many (much)
X?” (poson) or the form “How great is X?” or “What size is X?” (to pelikos). Here is the
56

For details and historical references see Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 72 - 84) and Proclus (1970, 52 - 57).
This is not the place to undertake a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s analysis of continuity. For a good
discussion see Miller, Jr. (1982) and Sorabji (1982). For a more recent discussion see Pfeiﬀer (2018).
57
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important point, which Aristotle shows an unfamiliarity with. In the case of magnitude,
numbers answer the question “How great?” or “What size is X?” in terms of proportion
between two numbers.58 Furley (1967, 52) writes:
The Pythagorean method relied on finding proportions, and not on counting
atomic constituents. It is the proportion 2:1 which constitutes the octave, no
matter what the units may be.
Just as in the case of harmonics, the Pythagorean answer to the magnitude question “How
great is X?” or “What size is X?” in geometry is a ratio or proportion (a proportion is
an equality between ratios) involving numbers determined by measuring the two magnitudes with respect to size. Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 153) speculates that the Pythagorean
theory of proportions was only applicable to commensurable magnitudes and that it was
Eudoxus’s work (which we find in Book V of The Elements) that generalized this theory to
include incommensurables. Thus, unlike Aristotle, who sought to distinguish arithmos from
megethos; for the Pythagoreans, there was only arithmos which was used to understand
the megethos.
Let me put this in another way. The Pythagoreans started with number theory. Numbers were understood, for example, as even or odd; perfect; prime and so on. Corroborating Heath’s claims, Van Der Waerden59 speculates that it was Eudoxus’s contribution
that found its way to The Elements in Book V; and Theaetetus’s contribution that found
its way to Book X, that sought to place Pythagorean number theory (or arithmetic) on
rigorous foundations (geometry). Eudoxus’s and Theaetetus’s genius made it possible to
embed the Pythagorean number theory into geometry using the general theory of proportions applicable to commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes. Euclid assembled
these results in Book V and Book X respectively. The result is that on the Pythagorean
conception of mathematics there was no need to have diﬀerent answers to questions involving quantity (“How many (much)?”, “How great is X?” or “What size is X?”) in terms of
discrete quantities and continuous quantities, as Aristotle thought. Rather, the answers are
all in terms of numbers: positive integers or whole numbers in the case of “How many?”;
or a ratio between two whole numbers in the case of “How great is X?” or “What size is
X?”(magnitude). This is how Proclus (1970, 49 Trans. lines 61f) puts it:
The theory of commensurable magnitudes is developed primarily by arithmetic
and then by geometry in imitation of it. This is why both sciences define
58
59

Proclus (1970, 53) credits Pythagoras for discovering the doctrine of proportions.
See Van Der Waerden (1961, 107 - 126; 141 - 146; 165 - 168; and 175 - 179).
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commensurable magnitudes as those which have to one another the ratio of a
number to a number, and this implies that commensurability exists primarily
in numbers.
We now can see why the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes (i.e. magnitudes that
cannot be expressed (irrational or alogos) as a ratio between two integers one of which is
their greatest common divisor or unit) was such an astonishing discovery. The astonishment
was not, as is often suggested, that there were “gaps” in the rational numbers that had to
be filled or completed by irrational numbers in order to get the real number continuum.
The astonishment is that the Pythagorean number-monism was being threatened.60
We all know that the first discovery of incommensurability was of what we denote today
√
by ‘ 2.’ The Pythagoreans would have used their number theory to say that there are no
√
√
two whole numbers m, n such that m : n :: 2 : 1. In other words, 2 is incommensurable
using 1 as the unit of measure. The proof is number theoretic since it is in terms of the
distinction between odd and even numbers. Aristotle is clearly aware of this proof since
√
he mentions it in Prior Analytics 41a26 - 27. But even though 2 was incommensurable,
the Pythagoreans still had a way of expressing it in terms of a proportion between known
√
magnitudes as follows: 2 : 1 :: diagonal of right-isosceles triangle with side of length
1: one of the sides of the right-isosceles triangle.
So, the Pythagoreans did not conclude that the rational numbers are incomplete (“gappy”
or discontinuous) as we often hear. The Pythagoreans were not even thinking about these
problems in terms of continuity or discontinuity at all. This can explain why The Elements is silent about its continuity assumptions except for Postulate 2 (To produce a finite
straight line continuously in a straight line). The reason is that The Elements could never
have doubted that magnitudes (such as lines) are continuous. We’ve already seen evidence
from the commentary of Proclus that continuity was a common notion. But what the
existence of incommensurables did do, was to motivate a program in search of a rigorous
theory of proportions between magnitudes in order to study, classify and ultimately understand what those newly discovered incommensurables were. This was the theory that was
developed by the magisterial Eudoxus and Theaetetus and immortalized in The Elements’s
Book V and Book X.
This brings us to the second diﬀerence between Aristotle and the Pythagoreans. Because Aristotle makes the distinction between continuous and discrete, he holds that there
are indivisible units in discrete quantities (number) but not in continuous quantities (magnitude). Consequently he mistakenly attributes to the Pythagoreans the view that there
60

Cf. Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 155).
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are indivisible magnitudes. That is, that the Pythagorean units (or indivisibles) have
spatial magnitude. He writes:
For [Pythagoreans] construct the whole universe out of numbers only – not
numbers consisting of abstract units; they suppose the units to have spatial
magnitude. But how the first unit was constructed so as to have magnitude,
they seem unable to say. Metaphysics 1080b17-1080b21
What evidence does Aristotle have to assert the last claim? His claim is justified only
because he held a diﬀerent conception of mathematics from the Pythagoreans. Not only
this, he also adds:
The doctrine of the Pythagoreans in one way aﬀords fewer diﬃculties than
those before named, but in another way has others peculiar to itself...[T]hat
bodies should be composed of numbers, and that this should be mathematical
number, is impossible. For it is not true to speak of indivisible magnitudes;
and however much there might be magnitudes of this sort, units at least have
no magnitude; and how can a magnitude be composed of indivisibles? But
arithmetical number, at least, consists of abstract units, while these thinkers
identify number with real things; at any rate they apply their propositions to
bodies as if they consisted of those numbers. Metaphysics 1083b8-1083b19
Here, Aristotle is expressing his misgivings about taking bodies to be composed wholly of
arithmetical numbers units, suggesting that this is impossible. First, it is not true to speak
of indivisible magnitudes, he says. Since a body is a magnitude (meaning continuous), it
cannot be composed of indivisible magnitudes (such as the arithmetical units). This is an
assertion he takes to have proven elsewhere. Secondly, on Aristotle’s view geometrical units
or points have no magnitude and so cannot be part of (or compose) a magnitude. I have
already discussed all of this in the previous section. Surprisingly, Kirk G.S. and J.E. Raven
(1957, 246ﬀ) point out that it is the Pythagoreans who are confused.
The unfortunate consequence of their diagrammatic representation of numbers
was that the Pythagoreans, thinking of numbers as spatially extended and confusing the point of geometry with the unit of magnitude, tended to imagine both
alike as possessing magnitude...It is true that Aristotle, in discussing the views
of earlier thinkers, often confronts them with such logical consequences of their
doctrines as they themselves never either enunciated or foresaw...[Aristotle]
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leaves no doubt that the Pythagoreans did indeed assume, that units are spatially extended; and when we come to consider the paradoxes of Zeno we shall
find that it is against this assumption, along with the confusion of points and
units, that they have their greatest force.
I disagree with Kirk and Raven’s attribution of confusion to the Pythagoreans. It is Aristotle who is confused or misunderstood the upshot of Pythagorean number theory. Remember
he said, “But how the first unit was constructed so as to have magnitude, [Pythagoreans]
seem unable to say.”(Metaphysics 1080b17-1080b21) Aristotle has no grounds for making
this claim. We know from historians that all the mathematics we find in The Elements
except for Book V was known before the time of Plato.61 This mathematical knowledge
includes the Pythagorean theory of proportions applicable to commensurables only, the
discussion of arithmetical units and the mathematical knowledge in The Elements Book X
on incommensurables. So we can reasonably expect the greatest student of Plato, Aristotle, to have known it. We may excuse Aristotle for being unfamiliar with the work of his
contemporary Eudoxus, another student of Plato, who showed that magnitudes or bodies
can be understood number theoretically according to the theory of proportions we find in
The Elements Book V. But I think it is nothing short of confusion for Aristotle to base his
objection to the Pythagoreans on the claim that the unit has magnitude. It is a confusion
because according to the Pythagoreans the unit has no magnitude (in Aristotle’s sense).
It is a number that is the common measure of commensurable magnitudes (in Aristotle’s
sense). Here, I speculate: if Aristotle had been familiar with Eudoxus’s work and been
charitable to the Pythagoreans, he would not have insisted on his theory of potential infinite
divisibility as the characteristic of the continuous – hence that magnitudes are infinitely
divisible.

3.3

Magnitudes and Incommensurables

In the previous subsection I have defended the argument that the thesis of infinite divisibility is a result of two diﬀerent conceptions of mathematics. I have still not discussed how the
historical confusion regarding incommensurable magnitudes and infinite divisibility arose.
Recall that one of the main arguments for infinite divisibility was the existence of incommensurable magnitudes. So now we must face two questions: (1) What are magnitudes?
and (2) What are incommensurable magnitudes?
Earlier we saw that Aristotle distinguished magnitudes from numbers by saying that
magnitudes are continuous and infinitely divisible. We remarked that this identification of
61

See Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 216 - 217).
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the continuous with the infinitely divisibility is a philosophical thesis that does not follow
from the bisection theorem. Although The Elements identifies arithmos (number) with the
collection of units in Book VII, it does not follow from The Elements alone that megethos
(magnitude) is not composed of units, where “not composed of units” is the definition of
continuous. It is, after all, open for someone to construe the “units” as actual points, not
parts, of a dense point-set continuum (something which Berkeley does). Commentators and
historians of mathematics have noticed that it is hard to grasp the meaning of megethos
because The Elements does not give us a definition that tells us what magnitudes are.62
What The Elements does give us is a theory of proportions, going back to the Pythagoreans
and Eudoxus, that tells us at least how to deal with megethos rigorously. This is the account
that we get in Books V, VII, and X. But in order to for me to show this and in order to
understand Books V, VII, and Book X, we need to inquire into the incommensurables more
closely.
Recall that Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans were unable to say how the unit was
constructed so as to have magnitude. In order to evaluate Aristotle’s claim, we need to look
at how incommensurability was discovered, under what assumptions, and what conclusions
the discoverers drew. There are three competing accounts: (1) the number-theoretic proof
regarding the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square of unit length; (2) the proofs
in Plato’s dialogues and the method of finding the mean proportional between two plane
similar numbers; (3) the method in The Elements Book X.63 Let us look at these accounts
in turn. I will not seek to disentangle which of these methods was the one that was actually
used. Here it is a matter of speculation. For my purposes, the question I shall be seeking
to answer is this: is the infinite divisibility of magnitudes assumed or does it follow from
the given proof in the method?
1. Number theoretic proof interpreted geometrically
The proof is familiar and proceeds by reductio ad absurdum. Let ABC be a right
isosceles triangle with side of unit length. Suppose that the diagonal AC is commensurable to the side AB. Let m : n be their ratio expressed in lowest terms (i.e.
the greatest common divisor of m and n is 1). Now AC 2 : AB 2 = m2 : n2 . Since
AC 2 = 2AB 2 by the Pythagorean theorem (The Elements Book I. 47), it follows
that m2 = 2n2 . Hence m2 is even and so is m. Since m : n is in its lowest terms, it
62

I will not attempt to speculate what Euclid meant by ‘magnitude.’ Here’s where examples work better
than definitions: lines, areas, volumes are magnitudes. See the discussion in Mueller (1981, 121f, 136 - 138)
for an attempt to sort out what magnitudes are.
63
These competing accounts are discussed in detail in Knorr (1975, 22 - 49) with references to Von Fritz
(1945). See also Knorr (1981), Unguru (1977), and compare with Heath (1981, 202 - 209).
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follows n is odd. Let m = 2a for some a; then 4a2 = 2n2 and n2 = 2a2 , hence n is
even. But this is impossible since n was shown to be odd. Therefore, the diagonal
AC is incommensurable with the side AB.64
Let us waive the diﬃculty that this proof (Proposition 117 in Euclid Book X) was
actually an interpolation as Heath (1956, Vol. 3, 2) suggests. The important point
to take away from this proof is that it is number theoretic and nowhere in the proof
has the assumption that finite lines are infinitely divisible entered into the reasoning.
Aristotle was familiar with this proof as I’ve mentioned.65 So it is unclear on what
basis he concluded that magnitudes are infinitely divisible from this theorem. If this
was indeed the way that incommensurables were shown to exist, then Berkeley is
right to say that it is a petitio principii to conclude from this that finite lines are
infinitely divisible.
2. The proofs in Plato’s dialogues and the method of finding the mean proportional
This number theoretic proof did not generalize in an obvious way to incommensurable
√
√ √
√
square roots greater than 2. The proofs that 3, 5, ..., 17 are incommensurable
with 1 as the unit of measure are reported in Plato’s Theaetetus, where it is said they
were developed by the Pythagorean Theodorus. There is some controversy regarding
exactly how Theodorus proved these incommensurability results since Plato does not
tell us the method. For this reason, Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 202 - 209) oﬀers three hy√
potheses. (1) The method of successively approximating 3 by a geometric sequence
with common ratio 12 ; (2) the traditional number theoretic approach used to show
√
that 2 is incommensurable with 1 as the unit of measure; and (3) a proposal by
Zeuthen based on the method for detecting incommensurability given by Proposition
2 in Euclid Book X.66 In any case, these are hypotheses and as far as I can tell,
there is no mention of infinite divisibility in the proofs according to the methods
suggested by these three hypotheses. In method (3) in particular, it is the existence
of a non-terminating number theoretic process that tells us that we are dealing with
incommensurable magnitudes. I have found no evidence in Berkeley that he is objecting to this non-terminating number theoretic process in the case of incommensurable
magnitudes.
64
See Heath (1981, 147 - 148) for discussion on how the Pythagoreans proved what is now Proposition
47 in The Elements Book I.
65
See Heath (1956, Vol. 3, 2)
66
Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 207) and Heath (1956, Vol. 3, 18) thinks that method (3) is similar to the
Euclidean algorithm for finding the greatest common divisor. I return to a detailed discussion of this
method in the next item.
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According to historians (Heath, 1981, Vol. 1, 89), the mathematics in Plato’s Timaeus
has Pythagorean themes and contains references to the existence of a geometric mean
between two square numbers and two geometric means between two cube numbers.67
Barrow thought that the theorem proving the existence of a mean proportional between two square numbers was the basis of incommensurability and that the method
presupposed the infinite divisibility of quantities. Here’s how he puts it in Mathematical Lectures XV (my emphasis):
The principal reason of incommensurability seems to be founded in this,
that since a mean proportional number may always be found between two
plane similar numbers because the product made by the multiplication of
plane similar numbers is always a square number, whose root is that mean
proportional ... since I say, things are thus in similar numbers, and it
is demonstrated in the Elements, that it happens quite otherwise in all
dissimilar numbers; there is no mean proportional number between two
dissimilar plane numbers. [H]ence, if two quantities are supposed to be to
one another in the [ratio] of two dissimilar numbers, and a mean proportional be found between those quantities, which may perpetually be done,
because of the indefinite divisibility of every quantity, there will be no number in universal nature which can represent or answer to this quantity, and
consequently, those being supposed and expressed by numbers, this will be
incommensurable.
Barrow’s point here sounds a lot more complicated than it is. It is actually Book
VIII. Proposition 11.68 Let’s put his point in more modern terms. A plane number
m is a number that is a product of two numbers a and b i.e. m = ab (Book VIII.
Proposition 5). According to Heath, plane similar numbers are what we call square
numbers today. But it is possible to generalize plane similar numbers to include
oblong (rectangular) numbers m = ab and n = cd such that the proportion a : c :: b : d
holds. Plane dissimilar numbers are oblong (rectangular) numbers m = ab and n = cd
such that the proportion a : c :: b : d does not hold.69 The mean proportional number
between two numbers m and n is what we call today the geometric mean of m, n. That
67

See Heath (1956, 363)’s note to The Elements Book VIII Proposition 11
Cf. Book X. Proposition 9.
69
See Heath (1956, 293 - 294) commentary on The Elements Book VII, Def. 21. Compare with Book
VI Proposition 13 (To two given straight lines to find a mean proportional) and the geometrico-algebraic
method given in The Elements Book II Proposition 14 (To construct a square equal to a given rectilineal
figure) involving the extraction of a square root.
68
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√
is, the number x, such that m : x :: x : n. So x = mn which is distinguished from
their arithmetic mean m+n
2 . Barrow’s point, following Book VIII. Proposition 11, is
that there is a rational mean proportional number between two plane numbers m and
n, just in case m and n are plane similar numbers. This is easy to see in the special
√
case where m and n are square numbers since in that case x = a2 b2 = ab. If m
√
and n are plane dissimilar numbers, then in general x = (ab) · (cd) is not a rational
number. Barrow argues that this is the principal reason for incommensurability and
that this follows because of the infinite (he uses the word ‘indefinite’) divisibility
of every quantity. But nowhere in the proofs has the infinite divisibility of finite
lines been assumed or concluded. So Berkeley is right that it is a petitio principii to
conclude, on the basis of this argument, that finite lines are infinitely divisible.
3. The Method of The Elements Book X Proposition 2
This being said, there is a non-terminating method for detecting incommensurable
magnitudes that is related to this method of finding the mean proportional.70 Heath
(1956, Vol. 3, 18) remarks that these propositions make essential use of the Euclidean
division algorithm for finding the greatest common divisor between two numbers (I
describe this method below). Von Fritz (1945) and Van Der Waerden (1961, 176f)
call this method anthyphairesis and speculate that incommensurables were discovered
by this method even though Heath (1981, Vol. 1, 207) finds it improbable. Let us
call this method epanalipsi-afairesis (repeated-subtraction) in order to distinguish it
from Aristotle’s potential infinite divisibility.71 Let’s look at this method starting
with Book X Proposition 2.
Book X Proposition 2
If, when the less of two unequal magnitudes is continually subtracted in turn from
the greater, that which is left never measures the one before it, the magnitudes will
be incommensurable.72
70

See Knorr (1975, 29f) for discussion although even he thinks that it is very unlikely that this was how
incommensurables were discovered.
71
I did not know that this method had a name until I read a brief discussion in Furley (1967, 49)
where he calls this process antistrofi-afaireisis (reciprocal-subtraction). I have chosen to call this process
epanalipsi-afairesis (repeated-subtraction) in order to remain faithful or closer to the plain reading of the
Greek text. In his discussion of the infinite in Physics III. 5 - 6 Aristole uses the term division(diaresis)
most frequently as the antithesis of addition(synthesis). He occasionally speaks of subtraction(afairesis)
and diminution(kathairesis). See also Heath (1956, Vol 1, 232). Could this be the method that presupposes
or concludes that magnitudes are infinitely divisible?
72
This proposition depends on Book X Proposition 1: Two unequal magnitudes being set out, if from
the greater there be subtracted a magnitude greater than its half, and from that which is left a magnitude
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Compare this with the number theoretic proposition in Book VII. There is a strong
analogy although the one is about incommensurables and the other is about relative
primes.
Book VII Proposition 1
Two unequal numbers being set out, and the less being continually subtracted in
turn from the greater, if the number which is left never measures the one before it
until a unit is left, the original numbers will be prime to one another.
The epanalipsi-afairesis method for detecting incommensurables is this: To determine
the proportion between two lengths M and m representing numbers, of which M is the
greater, first subtract m from M as many times as possible, leaving a remainder m′ .
Then subtract m′ from m in the same way leaving a remainder m′′ . Then subtract
m′′ from m′ and so on until no remainder (if at all) is left. The first length which can
be subtracted thus without leaving any remainder is the unit in terms of which the
ratio M : m can be expressed. The unit will vary according to what these lengths M
and m are. These units are not geometrical points but numerical measures.
Assuming that this was how incommensurables were first detected (and it is reasonable to do so since Book X is largely due to Theaetetus and predates Aristotle),
then what the Pythagoreans called a unit (monad ) is what we call today 1 (if the
numbers are relatively prime from Book VII.1) or the greatest common divisor of two
composite numbers if it existed (from Book VII.2). This “unit” (of measure) can be
used to measure (metron) the magnitude i.e. how great (to pelikos) a homogeneous
quantity is relative to another homogeneous quantity. If the answer to the question
“How great?” could be expressed as a ratio (i.e. it is logos) or proportion, then the
numbers were rational and the magnitudes representing them were commensurable.
The answers which the Pythagoreans would give would always be in terms of proportions, 4 : 2 :: 2 : 1 which means that 4 is 2 times as great as 2 using 2 as the unit. If
there is no greatest common divisor (including 1) between two numbers, then the two
magnitudes representing them are incommensurable. There is no common measure
or no way of comparing them with respect to size (by Book V. Definitions 3 and 4).
This would be the case if the process of epanalipsi-afairesis did not terminate after a
finite number of steps. But it is one thing to say that this non-terminating number
theoretic process is true for incommensurable magnitudes and it is another thing to
greater than its half, and if this process be repeated continually, there will be left some magnitude which
will be less than the lesser magnitude set out. This is a version of the Eudoxus-Archimedes Axiom in Book
V. Definition 4.
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conclude or assume on the basis of this, that the continuity of magnitudes consists
in their being infinitely divisible.
To see why this confusion was a mistake and misleading, consider a line equal in
length with the circumference of a circle and a line equal in length with the diameter
of the same circle. It is common ground between the Pythagoreans and Aristotle
that both these lines are continuous. Suppose that there are numbers which can be
represented by these lengths, say 22 (the circumfrence) and 7 (the diameter). There is
no greatest common divisor between these numbers (since this is one approximation
of the constant π). The process of epanalipsi-afairesis does not terminate in the
case of these two numbers and many others like them. But this has nothing to do
with continuity or infinite divisibility of the lengths representing these numbers as
Aristotle thought. Thus, incommensurability does not show that the essence of the
continuity of magnitudes is infinite divisibility. Rather, it shows that there are pairs
of magnitudes representing numbers for which this process of epanalipsi-afairesis does
not terminate after a finite number of steps.
Of some of these incommensurables, there are those that cannot be represented as a
ratio between known magnitudes (they are alogos, inexpressible or irrational, because
of this; rational otherwise). Notice that even though the magnitude (megethos) repre√
senting 2 is incommensurable using 1 as the unit of measure, the number (arithmos)
√
√
2 is not irrational or alogos in the Pythagorean sense. 2 can be expressed as the
ratio between known magnitudes, namely, the ratio between the diagonal of a rightisosceles triangle with side of unit and one of its sides. So incommensurability does
not imply irrationality. This is how what we mean by irrational numbers today diﬀers
from how the Pythagoreans conceived of them. However, magnitudes representing
√
numbers such as 19 are not only incommensurable with 1 as the unit of measure
but also irrational. Thus irrationality implies incommensurability. I am not sure how
to think of π in Pythagorean terms. It seems to me that even though π is incommensurable with 1 as the unit of measure, it is not irrational in the Pythagorean sense
since it can be expressed as the ratio between the circumference of a circle and its
diameter.

4

Conclusion

It is the conflation of the Aristotelian thesis of infinite divisibility with the non-terminating
epanalipsi-afairesis characteristic of incommensurability that has stayed with mathemati31
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cians and philosophers for millennia. This is the ancient prejudice that Berkeley was
alluding to. If the method that was first used for detecting incommensurable magnitudes
√
representing numbers besides ‘ 2’ was indeed Book X Proposition 2, then one way to read
Book X is as a geometric (hence rigorous) translation or formulation of number theoretic
facts. Incommensurability arises when number theoretic facts are being embedded in geometry, for example by trying to find the ratio or proportion between two magnitudes that
represent certain numbers. This raises the question of the proper foundations for mathematics: is it geometry or arithmetic? If Van der Waerden is right, then according to the
Pythagoreans, the way to place their number theoretic investigations on rigorous foundations was to cash them out geometrically. But this should therefore be a caution of trying
to interpret what Pythagoreans took to be a number theoretic fact (a non-terminating process) as evidence for a geometrical fact (the infinite divisibility of finite lines). Barrow, in
his mathematical lectures (Lecture III), famously argued for the identity of geometry with
arithmetic. Similarly, Aristotle objected to the importation of the Pythagorean number
theoretic discussion of units that can be represented geometrically as spatially extended
magnitudes. He raised the valid question, “If a unit is indivisible, how can it be spatially
extended?” To be sure, this is the right question for Aristotle to ask given his conception of mathematics; since for him spatially extended parts of magnitudes are divisible ad
infinitum. But the Pythagoreans meant something completely diﬀerent when they spoke
of representing units as magnitudes in geometry. We’ve seen that for the Pythagoreans,
these units are units of measure of the ratio between magnitudes i.e. what we refer to
today as either 1 (for two relatively prime numbers) or the greatest common divisor of two
magnitudes (if it existed) of two composite numbers. These units have nothing to do with
the divisibility (or lack thereof) of magnitudes since continuity was a common notion.
In conclusion, let me recapitulate the main points of this paper. I have given evidence
that the theory of proportions was motivated by number theoretic discoveries. The theory
of proportions developed by Eudoxus and Theaetetus was given in order to place these
discoveries on a rigorous foundation in The Elements’s Books V and X. Besides dissociating
the bisection theorem with infinite divisibility, I given reasons for resisting the assimilation
of a number theoretic process with the geometric thesis of infinite divisibility; and the
Aristotelian identification of continuity with infinite divisibility. Thus, Berkeley is right
in pointing out that infinite divisibility of finite lines is not an axiom or theorem in The
Elements. If Aristotle’s view – that actual indivisible points cannot compose a magnitude –
assumes the philosophical thesis of infinite divisibility, then I hope to have shown that this
thesis flows out of a diﬀerent conception of mathematics and is not necessary to develop
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the theory of proportions along Pythagorean lines and hence to handle magnitudes (or
continuous quantities).
This then opens up the possibility of thinking in terms of indivisible points with position
as the actual constituents of magnitudes – a possibility that was of course taken up by
later mathematicians like Dedekind and Cantor. Berkeley, in fact, was more favorably
disposed to indivisibles than to the theory of diﬀerential and integral calculus based on
infinitesimals. It was this method of indivisibles which began to suggest to Berkeley the
possibility of geometric minima i.e. the conception of magnitudes as composed of actual
indivisible points. But this is the subject for my other paper. What I have done in this
paper is substantiate Berkeley’s claim that infinite divisibility of finite lines is neither an
axiom nor a theorem in The Elements but is rooted in Aristotelian prejudice.
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Luce, A. A. and T. E. Jessop (1948 – 1957). The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of
Cloyne. Thomas Nelson Ltd.
Maddy, P. (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Manchak, J. and B. W. Roberts (2016). Supertasks. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
Mancosu, P. (1996). Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford University Press.
Miller, Jr., F. D. (1982). Aristotle against the Atomists. In N. Kretzmann (Ed.), Infinity
and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, pp. 87 – 111. Cornell University Press.
Mueller, I. (1981). Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid’s Elements. MIT Press.
Mwakima, D. (2020). Berkeley’s Mathematical Atomism. unpublished work in progress.
Pfeiﬀer, C. (2018). Aristotle’s Theory of Bodies. Oxford University Press.
Pressman, H. M. (1997). Hume on Geometry and Infinite Divisibility in the Treatise. Hume
Studies 23 (2), 227–244.
Proclus (1970). Proclus: A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements (Trans.
Glenn R. Morrow). Princeton University Press.
35

David Mwakima

Berkeley on Infinite Divisibility

Reeder, P. (2018). Labyrinth of Continua. Philosophia Mathematica 26 (1), 1–39.
Schechtman, A. (2019). Three Infinities in Early Modern Philosophy. Mind 128 (512),
1117–1147.
Sherry, D. M. (1988). Zeno’s Metrical Paradox Revisited. Philosophy of Science 55 (1),
58–73.
Simplicius (2014). Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 6 (Translated by David Konstan).
Bloomsbury Publishing.
Skyrms, B. (1983). Zeno’s Paradox of Measure. In From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on
Quantity, Coherence, and Induction, pp. 5 – 37. Oxford University Press.
Sorabji, R. (1982). Atoms and Time Atoms. In N. Kretzmann (Ed.), Infinity and Continuity
in Ancient and Medieval Thought, pp. 17 – 86. Cornell University Press.
Unguru, S. (1977). Incommensurability and Irrationality: A New Historical Interpretation.
History of Science 15, 216 – 227.
Van Der Waerden, B. L. (1961). Science Awakening (English translation by Arnold Dresden
with additions of the author). Oxford University Press.
Von Fritz, K. (1945). The Discovery of Incommensurability by Hippasus of Metapontum.
Annals of Mathematics, 242–264.

36

